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Abstract— Virtual coupling is a promising innovation aimed
at increasing railway capacity. Compared to current railway
signaling systems, it allows two or more trains to run with
reduced headway between them. However, such reduced head-
ways are a challenge to safety. In this work we consider this
challenge by formally describing and verifying an approach to
virtual coupling. We propose a general modeling method based
on topological manifolds to describe the protection logic for
virtual coupling train control systems. We also describe the basic
train control elements in topological terms and analyze the line
condition of our virtual coupling logic. We establish that the
line condition safety requirements and its representation as a
manifold are equivalent and further provide a formal definition
of the concept of a movement authority with manifold notations.
This allows us to consider the dynamic behavior of trains and a
series of theorems that establish the correctness of our protec-
tion logic for virtual coupling. Finally, we apply the presented
methods to a case study. The results show that the proposed
method provides a suitable way to realize a virtual coupling
logic safely.
Index Terms— Virtual coupling control, manifold based model,
train-centric train control system, formal verification.
I. INTRODUCTION
TRAIN control systems are designed to guarantee theoperational safety of trains with high efficiency. The
European Train Control System (ETCS) level 2 is the current
state of the art for train operation and has been applied suc-
cessfully in many countries. However, the railway community
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still faces growing demands to increase railway line capacity
on existing tracks [1]. Increasing capacity is also one of the
primary objectives of the Shift2Rail program, which outlines
future rail-focused research and innovation activities [2]. Much
exploration has been undertaken by railway researchers and
institutions towards this endeavor [3]–[6]. New train-to-train
communication techniques show better performance compared
to current centralized communication-based train control sys-
tems [7]. Based on such train-to-train communication tech-
niques, advanced signaling approaches such as virtual coupling
can be realized to improve the utilization and efficiency of
a railway line [8]. It has been shown that virtual coupling
can decrease headway between trains effectively by creating
multiple train convoys [9]. Specifically, in [10], [11], concrete
methods based on control theory are proposed to demonstrate
the performance of virtual coupling.
However, with such advancement comes skepticism with
regards to level of safety, especially for safety critical railway
signaling systems. Here we aim to provide a formally verified
virtual coupling approach. Formal methods and formal
verification provide an effective way to improve/analyze
the safety of a system as suggested by EN50128 [12],
especially for safety critical systems such as railway signaling
systems [13]. Numerous efforts have been made to apply
formal methods in railway systems [14]–[16]. Vu et al.
presented a formal verification tool suite to verify the sequen-
tial release feature of interlocking systems [17]. Berger et al.
verified the European Rail Traffic Management
System (ERTMS) with real-time Maude [18] whilst
James et al. have presented an extendable tool-set to verify
the interlocking system combining several formal verification
methods [19]. Another research issue is model-based
functional testing, which could also improve the safety of the
system effectively [20]. This approach has already been used
for the testing of ETCS on-board controllers [21], [22].
Most of these efforts have been focused on applying general
formal modeling techniques, which may not describe the train
operation principles perfectly [23]. For this reason, researchers
have devoted much effort to the development of domain
specific languages to describe and verify railway system
properties more efficiently [24], [25]. In particular, Wang et al.
have proposed a point-set topology based modeling method
for the current Chinese Train Control System (CTCS) level
3 standard, which reflects fixed block signaling principles
through space represented by basic elements of the train
control system [26]. Furthermore, Wang et al. presented a
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safety monitor for interlocking systems through the use of
point set theory [27]. The work focused on train control
systems that are essentially based around a discrete control
logic. As for virtual coupling logic, the intelligent process-
ing unit of the system should take the moving train state
into consideration. In order to capture this continuous train
movement, safety assurance researchers have explored the
application of hybrid specification languages. For example,
Platzer and Quesel applied theorem proving methods based on
hybrid systems to verify aspects of ETCS based on differential
dynamic logic [28]. Similarly, Zhang et al. have presented an
online safety observer based on hybrid reachability analysis for
the on-board equipment of CTCS-3 in which the continuous
train movement is modeled by hybrid automata [29].
Physical train movement takes place on an x-y plane with
different speed (so the movement of a train can be described
as a curve in a 3-dimension coordinate: 2-dimensional track
layout plane and speed). Since the aim of train control systems
is to separate trains as closely as possible, the control logic is
not only about how to realize speed control in order to allow
trains to run closer, it also considers how the relevant switches
to compose the single line for trains to operate.
In traditional ETCS-like systems, those functions are dis-
patched to different subsystems to be fulfilled. For example,
the route control process is usually done by an Interlocking
system, the movement authority is dispatched to a Radio Block
Center (RBC), and the over-speeding protection function is
fulfilled by on-board equipment. While for train-centric control
systems, these functions are undertaken only by the on-board
equipment. Consequently, there is a need to study effective
modeling methods for both control systems to implement
somewhat complex virtual coupling logic.
Normal arithmetic is used in the speed control function
of current train control system, but is not suitable for the
switch control process. The method mentioned in reference
[26] only considers the line resources arrangement in the
railway line but does not take the speed control process
into consideration, which is a continuous behavior of trains.
So, we adopt the presented manifold theory to model the
train behavior under virtual coupling control. With the model
described by the manifold, we can analyze, model, and deduce
the whole control process including switch control, train
order, and over-speeding protection modules under the same
mathematical framework.
Virtual coupling in a train-centric way has also been consid-
ered in [30] who also use concepts of topological manifolds.
The main difference is the work only focused on train-centric
control systems. In particular it provided algorithms for mon-
itoring the virtual coupling logic where the monitor would
interfere should non-safe situation arise according to the
behavior of trains. While for this paper, we address virtual
coupling on a fundamental level, which is independent of
the control system. Our approach works for both train-centric
(distributed) or current state of the art ETCS/CTCS (cen-
tralized) control systems. We provide new topological con-
cepts to develop new safety conditions. Also the effect of
switches on virtual coupling logic has been analyzed. A map
function is proposed to tackle the relevant location relation
between dynamic train location and static basic equipment
locations. Using the notion of manifolds, the control of the
switches (movements in the track layout plane) and the speed
adjustment (movement in track layout-speed space) have been
modeled in a unified methodology.
In addition, the conditions for which trains can be virtually
coupled are clarified based on a topological representation
of train control elements through proving the equivalence
between the introduced manifold condition and the safety
requirements needed for virtual coupling to occur. Move-
ment authority is re-defined by a notion based on manifolds,
which takes the dynamic behavior of trains into considera-
tion. A worst-case condition is considered in order to make
the dynamic behavior closer to reality. Train length is also
taken into consideration in the definitions of manifold curves.
Furthermore, a series of theorems are presented that prove the
safety of our proposed computation method. That is, based
upon extending the notion of space (from traditional distance
to distance-speed), the principle of separating spaces for
different trains is preserved by the manifold based movement
authority definition.
Our methodology models concrete track sections, switches,
trains within the train control domain (which are presented in
a traditional view) as abstract topological elements (which are
presented in a topological view), which leads to a rigorous
unified formal model. The model also reflects the property of
train control principles in a natural way, beyond specific basic
railway equipment (switches etc.). As a benefit of its mathe-
matic nature, one can better understand the whole integrated
train control concept and reuse the manifold theorems to prove
its safety. The model also contributes to a less error-prone
development of a virtual coupling system implementation, due
to its unambiguous description and proved safety guarantee.
Since the notion of a “point” appears in both railway
systems and topological manifold theory, we will use the
American term “switch” in place of the British term “point”
for the railway component in order to avoid confusion with
the point in topological manifold theory.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section II,
we introduce the details of virtual coupling. Section III gives
the theory of our manifold modeling methods for virtual cou-
pling. A case study is then given in section IV to illustrate our
method. Finally, section V concludes the paper by outlining
future aspirations and directions.
II. VIRTUAL COUPLING
We now introduce virtual train coupling, basing on the defi-
nition of [30], which however was thought to be implemented
as an independent module of the on-board equipment, in a
train-centric control system. However, train-to-train commu-
nication is required to implement virtual coupling in both
systems. In this paper, we assume that wireless train-to-train
communication has no time delays. As for the implementation
in ETCS like systems, the general model of the protection
logic would rely on existing basic equipment, and the safety
effect led by basic equipment locations would be further
analyzed.
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Fig. 1. Comparison between virtual coupling (top) and moving block (bottom) control logic.
In this section, we first compare train movements under
moving block with those under virtual coupling. Then we
come up with two questions about the implementation of
virtual coupling and analyze the safety line conditions under
virtual coupling logic on the basis of existing basic equipment,
which was not considered in [30].
A. Basic Principles of Virtual Coupling
Virtual coupling is an advanced signaling control concept
that greatly improves capacity with respect to traditional fixed
block approaches [30]. Trains running under a virtual coupling
scheme with the same travel direction will be allowed to
run closer than the trains using traditional fixed/moving block
strategies. Actually, it is also considered superior to moving
block systems, however has yet to be implemented.
The difference between moving block and a virtual coupling
logic is shown in Fig. 1. For two trains operating in the same
direction as shown in Fig. 1, the following train is the orange
train on the left, and the preceding train is the blue one on
the right. The semi-transparent trains represent the location
trains could reach in the future. For the moving block systems
(the bottom picture in Fig. 1), the maximal End of Authority
(EoA, the location to which the train is authorized to move
and where the target speed is zero.) of the following train
would be the current location of the preceding train. For the
virtual coupling logic (the top picture in Fig. 1, the dashed
line represents the trains are virtually coupled), the final stop
location of the following train exceeds the location where the
preceding train currently is.
Virtual coupling has been shown to increase capacity, cf.,
e.g., [31]. The headway for scenarios frequently seen in real
world could be decreased by 43% compared to ETCS level
3 system on which moving block is adopted. Without consid-
ering all the different scenarios where virtual coupling leads
to capacity gains, we want to point out that as shown in Fig 1,
the separation distance between the semitransparent trains is
much smaller in the coupled train scenario than in moving
block scenario. Virtual coupling relies on the assumption
that the preceding train will not come to a stop instantly.
Furthermore, the brake operation of the lead train is known to
the following train thanks to train-to-train communication.
In order to realize virtual coupling, there are two basic
problems that need to be settled.
1) The first problem deals with how to insert or remove a
train from the virtual coupling queue. The destinations
of different trains vary according to their own scheduled
plans. However, they may share a common railway line
in a specific area during their whole travel. How to
insert/remove a train into a queue when a following
train enters/leaves the shared line is a critical question
of virtual coupling control.
2) The second problem is the movement authority com-
putation logic for trains in a queue, which considers
various over-speeding protection functions. The move-
ment authority computation should take the movement
of both the preceding train and following train into
consideration, which is vastly different to the current
computation processes.
B. Safety Analysis of Railway Line Conditions Under Virtual
Coupling
In order to realize the virtual coupling logic, the accurate
speed and location of trains should be taken into consideration
in the control logic for both train-centric or current train
control systems. In addition, the position and locking state
of switches is also essential in the control logic.
The first problem mentioned in the above section is to
determine the condition for a train to virtually couple with
the preceding train. The safety requirements in this situation
should look at the switch positions and locking states. The
distance between two trains, and between the trains and
switches should also be taken into consideration. We analyze
several basic scenarios to illustrate the condition for a train to
be virtually coupled as shown in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2. Illustration of the line condition under different scenarios on virtual
coupling logic.
In these scenarios, there are two trains named t1 and t2. The
question is whether the following train t1 could be virtually
coupled with the preceding train t2. The destinations are
denoted by D1 and D2 for t1 and t2 respectively. There is
one switch equipment denoted by p1 in the railway line.
Firstly we will discuss the situation where the trains have
different destinations.
In scenario 1 as shown in Fig. 2a, t1 and t2 are running
in the section between stations and are far away from the
switch contained in the station. The dashed line represents the
destination paths of both trains. Even though the destinations
are different, t1 can still be virtually coupled with t2 to gain
extra capacity due to a common long overall path. When t2 is
approaching p1 in the station as shown in scenario 2 (Fig. 2b),
if the distance d between t2 and the switch p1 is large enough
for t2 to brake before p1, then t1 can be virtually coupled
with t2. As for the time of switch movement, an extra distance
between trains should be added by decreasing t1 speed. When
t2 has already passed p1 or the distance d is smaller than
the t2′s braking distance to p1, then whether t1 should or
should not be virtually coupled to t2 would depend on the
required states and current states of switch 1 as shown in
scenario 2 and 3 (Fig. 2b and Fig. 2c). If the required position
is not consistent with the current switch position (which is
consistent with the required position by t2), then t1 should
not be virtually coupled to t2. If t1 is virtually coupled with
t2 under this situation, p1 might not be moved to the right
position required by t1 in time, which would lead to derailment
of t1.
Now we discuss the situation in which the trains travel
to the same destination, which means both t1 and t2 will
pass p1 as scheduled with the same position. In this case,
whether or not trains are approaching the switch would not be
a problem, the only concern being that the specific relevant
switches should be locked into the right position as required by
the two trains. As a result, we just draw one picture in which
train t2 passed switch p1 as shown in scenario 4 (Fig. 2d).
The line condition for trains safely running under virtual
coupling is that there should be an overlapped path between
the destination path and the train-to-train path, and if switches
are included in the overlapped path or the distance d as
introduced in the scenario above, the switch should be locked
in the right position for trains to pass.
Here the switch p1 could be only one switch, or a complex
composition of several switches. Since the train will pass the
switches one by one, this composition can be considered as a
sequence of switches. If the required position of any switch in
the sequence is the same, then this switch could be treated as a
part of the straight railway line. If the required position of any
is different, then it comes to the situation introduced above.
In that case, complex switch compositions could be tackled in
the same way as described above.
The second problem would be how to realize the safety
protection of virtual coupling control regarding the location
and speed of trains once the railway line condition analyzed
in section II-B is satisfied. Traditional railway signaling tech-
nology would divide the whole control process into several
functions, e.g., the MA computation and the speed control
process. Each function is undertaken by specific equipment.
The MA is actually a discrete allocation logical computation
result described by the track sections in the traditional signal-
ing system. The track sections allocated give a separate space
for each train to operate without the possibility of collision.
In virtual coupling control systems, trains run closer than
under traditional fixed/moving block principles. As a result,
the new “MA” information should consider train speed and
location information, and also obey the train separation con-
cept. In order to guarantee the safety of train operation,
a correct MA should be allocated to each of the trains, which
ensures that the movement inside the MA does not lead to
collisions with the obstacles in front of trains. The movement
of a train should be controlled inside the allocated space during
operation to avoid possible collisions. Lastly, the allocated MA
of different trains should not overlap.
III. MANIFOLD BASED TRAIN CONTROL
In this section, the problems mentioned in section II-A
will be described based on topological manifold theory. Tra-
ditionally, railway systems and the features of the elements
are described using natural language. Often these descriptions
are very detailed and lengthy, describing all the characteristics
of the railway line elements. This often leads to engineers
or developers paying attention to the information of specific
tracks or switches, but makes it easy to ignore the topological
relations among basic equipment, which represent the nature
of railway signaling principles.
Here we adopt the topological view on the railway elements
as a kind of abstraction to implement the virtual coupling
logic in a mathematical based format. Based on that we
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could describe the safety protection logic rigorously and better
address the core railway signaling principles. A topological
description of the CTCS-3 system has been proposed in
[26], [27], [32]. All the previous work is about discrete
representation without considering the speed and location of
trains. We therefore adopt the topological manifold concept to
describe the movements of trains on the railway line.
Compared with our previous work, several new definitions
are introduced for describing elements or used in the proof
of theorems. Track sections and trains are also described as
topological elements. Hence, the proposed modeling method
could be used in current centralized train control systems.
In order to formalize the virtual coupling line condition a
path notion is proposed to help describe the condition, and
also the intersection of two paths is introduced. In addition,
a sequence map function is proposed to determine the relevant
location relation among topological elements. As for the
movement authority under virtual coupling, we define several
curves to describe different train movements. These differ
from the curves proposed in our previous work, we consider
train behavior under worst conditions, which make the move-
ment authority more suitable to the accurate virtual coupling
requirement. The definitions of the curves also take train
lengths into consideration, which is closer to reality. At the
end of this section, three theorems are proved to clarify the
safety of the virtual coupling logic.
A. Preliminaries
Definition 1: A topology on a set S is a collection T of
subsets containing both the empty set ∅ and the set S such
that T is closed under arbitrary unions and finite intersections.
The pair (S,T ) is called a topological space [33].
To simplify the notation, we refer to a pair (S,T ) as the
“topological space S” in the rest of the paper. Hence, when
we refer to a subset or to the cardinality of a topological space
(S,T ), we refer to a subset of S, or to the cardinality of S,
hence freely using notations X ⊆ S, or |S|.
Definition 2: An open ball B(p, r) with center p ∈ Rn
and radius r > 0 is the set B(p, r) = {x ∈ Rn|d(x, p) < r},
where d(x, p) is the distance between two points x and p in








For simplicity, we denoted B(p, r) as B , Bn represents an
open ball of dimension n.
Definition 3: If X and Y are topological spaces, a home-
omorphism from X to Y is a bijective map φ : X → Y
such that both φ and φ−1 are continuous. If there exists an
homeomorphism between X and Y , we say that X and Y are
homeomorphic [33].
Definition 4: Given a point p in a topological space X ,
a neighborhood of p is a subset V of X that includes an open
subset U containing p, i.e., p ∈ U ⊆ V .
Definition 5: A topological space M is locally Euclidean
of dimension n if every point p in M has a neighborhood U
such that there is homeomorphism φ from U onto an open
subset of Rn . We call the pair (U, φ : U → Rn) a chart [33],
U a coordinate neighborhood and φ a coordinate map on U .
Definition 6: A topological space X is said to be a Haus-
dorff space if given any pair of distinct points p1, p2 ∈ X ,
there exist neighborhoods U1 of p1 and U2 and p2 with
U1 ∩ U2 = ∅ [34].
Definition 7: A topological space X is said to be second
countable if it admits a countable basis for its topology T .
A countable sub-collection B of T is a countable basis for the
topology T , if given an open set U and point p in U there is
an open set B ∈ B such that p ∈ B ⊂ U [33].
Definition 8: A n-dimensional topological manifold M is
a second countable Hausdorff space that is locally Euclidean
of dimension n [34].
Loosely speaking, a manifold is a topological space that is
locally Euclidean. It is a generalization of curves and surfaces
to higher dimensions. The coordinates on a chart allow us to
carry out computations as though in an Euclidean space.
Definition 9: A function is C∞ means that the function is
differentiable for all degrees of differentiation [33].
Definition 10: Two charts(U, φ : U → Rn) and (V , ψ :
V → Rn) of a topological manifold are C∞ compatible if the
two maps
φ ◦ ψ−1 : ψ(U ∩ V ) → φ(U ∩ V ),
ψ ◦ φ−1 : φ(U ∩ V ) → ψ(U ∩ V ) (2)
are C∞ [33].
Definition 11: A C∞ atlas on a locally Euclidean space M
is a collection U = {(Uα, φα)} of pairwise compatible charts
that cover M , i.e., such that M = ⋃α Uα [33].
Definition 12: A n-dimensional manifold with boundary is
a second countable Hausdorff space in which every point has
neighborhood homeomorphism either to an open subset of Rn ,
or to an open subset of Hn [33], where Hn ⊂ Rn is defined
by equation 3.
H
n = {(x1, . . . xn) ∈ R : xn ≥ 0} (3)
Definition 13: If M is an n-manifold with boundary, a point
p ∈ M is called an interior point of M if it is in the domain
of an interior chart; and it is called a boundary point of M if
it is in the domain of a boundary chart that takes p to Hn . The
boundary of M, denoted by ∂M, is the set of all its boundary
points, and its interior, denoted by IntM, is the set of all its
interior points [34].
B. Basic Elements Representations
The virtual coupling system could be implemented on the
basis of current ETCS systems or newly proposed train-centric
control systems. Since a train operates on a railway line,
the basic elements of the railway line need to be defined.
As for current CTCS-3 or ETCS-2 systems, signals are
not needed for the control process. For future ETCS-3 or
train-centric control systems, track sections are also elimi-
nated. However, in order to be compatible with as many as
possible train control systems, in this paper, we discuss the
virtual coupling model with general basic equipment, which
are track sections, switches and signals (which are mentioned
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as stop locations for trains in this paper for the sake of virtual
coupling logic).
In addition, a train is defined to be a topological point in
the computation of the protection logic. In what follows we
introduce definitions of basic elements in current train control
systems.
Definition 14: A train stop location is represented by a
triple s = (p, dir, res), where
• p is the stop location in (x,y) coordinates,
• dir is the direction the train travels in,
• res is the reserved state of the stop location.
There are only two directions for a train to travel, dir = 1
means that the train travels in the down direction, and dir = 0
for the up direction.
The reserved state of a stop location indicates if the stop
location is reserved for a specific train to pass or not. If the
stop location is reserved by no train, res = 0. If it is reserved
by one train, then res = 1.
We define track sections without switches inside them.
Definition 15: A track section without a switch is a con-
nected non-empty set (intuitively a line segment) and repre-
sented by a 6-tuple ts = (pl, pr, dir, os, ls, res), where
• pl is the left end location in (x,y) coordinates,
• pr is the right end location in (x,y) coordinates,
• dir is the direction of the track section when train passes,
• os is the occupation state of the track section,
• rs is the required occupation state of the track section for
virtual coupling,
• ls is the locking state of the track section,
• res is the reserved state of the track section.
pl and pr are location values of the left and right end
point of the segment. dir has the same meaning as it is in the
definition of stop location. os = 0 represents the track section
is occupied and os = 1 unoccupied. The value of rs represents
the required state of the track section when it is used for virtual
coupling logic of trains. rs = 0 represents the track section is
connected from pl (pr ) to pr (pl) and also unoccupied by a
train, rs = 1 represents the track section is unconnected and
occupied by a train. The value of ls represents the locking
state of the track section, ls = 1 represents that the track
section is locked, and ls = 0 represents that it is not locked.
The value of res also has the same meaning as explained in
the stop location definition above.
We define a function T (ts) in order to know whether a
track section can be used to generate the movement authority
under virtual coupling logic.
The function T (ts) can be computed according to the
information of track section ts as shown in equation 4.
If T (ts) = 1, it means that the track section ts is safe to
generate the movement authority. If T (ts) = 0, the track
section ts is not allowed to generate the movement authority
due to safety issues. Here, we assume that the track sections
would work as designed, i.e., if there is a train on the track,
then the track reflects an occupied state.
T (ts) = ts.ls (4)
Fig. 3. The switch unit of the railway line.
Another basic element of a railway line for train control
systems are switches. A switch is represented by a 9-tuple
as shown in definition 16. It is also a connected non-empty
set and the stem location denoted as pm is in the middle of
the line segment intuitively, as shown in Fig. 3. The pn and
pr are the normal end location and reverse end location of
the switch. The normal position of a switch would allow train
travel from pm to pn or from pn to pm, the reverse position
would allow train travel from pm to pr or from pr to pm.
The value of ds represents the position of a switch, ds = 0
represents that the switch is in normal, ds = 1 represents
that the switch is in reverse position, and ds = 2 represents
the switch has lost indication. The value of ls has the same
meaning as defined in 15.
The reserved state of the switch indicates if the switch is
reserved for a specific train to pass or not. The value of res
is the id of the train which reserves the given switch. If the
given switch is not reserved by any train, res = 0. A switch
can only be reserved by one train at a time. Once the switch
is reserved, it cannot be controlled by commands from other
trains.
The value of rs represents the required switch position for
a path, rs = 0 represents that the required switch position is
in normal and the switch is connected from pm (pn) to pn
(pm), rs = 1 represents that the required switch position is in
reverse and the switch is connected from pm (pr ) to pr (pm),
and rs = 2 represents that the path does not need this switch
at any specific position and the switch is not connected from
pm to either pr or pn. rs = 3 represents that the required
switch position is unclear, i.e. the required position is different
for this switch by different paths.
Definition 16: A switch of a railway line is represented by
a 9-tuple pt = (id, pm, pn, pr, dir, ds, rs, ls, res), where
• id is the identification of the switch in the railway line,
• pm is the stem location of the switch in (x,y) coordinates,
• pn is the normal end location of the switch in (x,y)
coordinates,
• pr is the reverse end location of the switch in (x,y)
coordinates,
• dir is the direction of the switch when train passes,
• ds is the position of the switch,
• rs is the required switch position by a path through it,
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• ls is the locking state of the switch,
• res is the reserved state of the switch.
Among the attributes of a switch defined in definition 16,
some are static, given by the physical location of the switch,
while some are dynamic and express the state of the switch.
For a switch pt , we define a function P (pt) to know
whether it can be used to generate a movement authority
under virtual coupling logic. The function P(pt) can be
computed according to the information of switch pt as shown
in equation 5. If P (pt) = 1, it means that the switch pt
is safe to generate the movement authority. If P (pt) =
0, the switch pt is not allowed to generate the movement
authority due to safety issues.
P (pt) =
{
1, i f pt .ds = pt .rs and pt .ls = 1
0, i f pt .ls = 0, or pt .ds = pt .rs. (5)
The topological representation of a train is defined as shown
in definition 17. The stop location of a train is calculated by
the safe brake curve (to be introduced in section III-D), which
is used to determine the sequence of basic elements in the
topological representation of the railway line.
Definition 17: A train in a railway line is represented by a
7-tuple tr = (id, ps, pe, pr, v, dir, dec), where
• id is the identification of the train in the railway line,
• ps is the current location of train’s maximum safe front
end in (x,y) coordinates,
• pe is the final stop location of maximum safe front end
ξs(s, 0) in (x,y) coordinates of the train following the safe
brake curve,
• pr is the current location of train’s minimum safe rear
end in (x, y) coordinates,
• v is the current speed of the train,
• dir is the direction of the train traveling,
• dec represents the emergency brake deceleration of the
train.
In our model, we consider locations of a train’s maximum
safe front end and minimum safe rear end for the sake of
inaccuracy of train positioning functions. We assume that those
locations could be obtained by considering train length and
error margins of specific train positioning equipment.
The traditional view shows the actual location of trains and
switches on the railway line. The topological view is how the
physical location is mapped into a topological representation
with a sequence. Both have enough information for the logic
computation. The beneficial thing is that in the topological
representation, we could focus on the topological feature
(compactness, connectivity etc.) of railway elements on an
abstract level when we need, without considering specific
locations, lengths and states accordingly. If we need the
specific information, we still could acquire them through the
attributes of topological elements to fulfill the calculation.
The switch and stop location elements can be transferred
into topological representations according to the railway line
layout. Since static elements like switch and stop location
are fixed, their order in the topological representation is also
fixed. However the location of a train changes along with the
movement of the train. The train could therefore be mapped
Fig. 4. Illustration of the train element map to the topological representation.
into the topological representation according to the dynamic
speed and location of the train. If the train t is located near
a switch pt , a track section ts or stop location element s,
then the sequence of the topological representation between a
train and other elements could be determined by the function
H(t, ∗), where ∗ could be either pt , ts or s, and ∗.p represents
any of the location parameters of the switch or stop location.
The function H(t, ∗) takes the train t and the near railway
element (track section, switch or stop location) as input, then
outputs relative position of t and the near element (whether a
train is in front of the near railway element or otherwise).
We define that the location value of railway elements is
growing from left to right, i.e., for two railway elements ∗1,
∗2, if ∗1.p < ∗2.p, then ∗1 is located on the left of ∗2.
Consequently, the map function H(t, ∗) could be determined




〈∗, t〉 , i f ∗ .p < min(t .pr, t .pe) or
t .dir = 1, t .pr < ∗.p < t .pe
〈t, ∗〉 , i f ∗ .p > max(t .pr, t .pe) or
t .dir = 0, t .pe < ∗.p < t .pr
(6)
For example, train t is running from the left to right
(t .dir = 1) as shown in Fig. 4. In 4a, t is located far from
the switch pt , i.e. t .pr < pt .pm, t .pe < pt .pm. As a result,
the elements in topological view would be described as shown
in Fig. 4a.
When train t continues running until t .pr < pt .pm < t .pe
as shown in Fig. 4b, we could map the sequence of t and
pt through H(t, pt) as shown in topological view of Fig. 4b.
Compared to the sequence of Fig. 4b, the relation of t and pt
are still neighbors but with a different sequence.
Train t needs to take the state of switch pt into consideration
in order to ensure safety of train operation. When the minimum
rear end location of train t has passed the switch, the elements
in the topological view are shown in Fig. 4c.
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Fig. 5. Illustration of the Topological spaces of two paths.
C. Line Condition on Virtual Coupling
In order to realize the virtual coupling control there is a limit
condition for the railway line elements, which could affect the
safety of train operation as described in section II-B.
Based on the basic topological elements above, we firstly
define some basic notations which could help further represent
the train trajectory on the railway line.
We define U to represent the specific topological element
of the railway line, which could be denoted as a pair as
shown in equation 7. u and u.rs represents the abstract shape
of corresponding topological elements. For example, if u1
represents a specific switch, then u1 is the shape of a whole
with two directions to go when we mention u1, and u1.rs
represents just one direction of the switch (segment between
u1.pm and u1.pn or between u1.pm and u1.pr ). As for train
and stop location, we could represent them only by u, i.e., if
u represents a train or stop location, then u.rs = NU L L.
U = (u, u.rs) (7)
Then, we describe a specific railway element intuitively with
a pair γi :
γi = (ui , ui .rs) (8)
In order to clarify topological manifold property of switches
or track sections regarding their position or occupation state,
we define two projection functions to map the topological
element to specific states as shown in equation 9. Pro1(γi )
and Pro2(γi ) map (ui , ui .rs) onto ui or ui .rs accordingly.
Pro1(γi ) = {ui |∃γi ∈ p, ui = Pro1(γi )}
Pro2(γi ) = {ui .rs|∃γi ∈ p, ui .rs = Pro2(γi )} (9)
We then define the notion of path as:
Definition 18: A path is a set of connected topological ele-
ments which is denoted as a sequence of topological elements
pair:
p = 〈γ0, γ1, . . . , γn〉
The topological space of a path is a power set of the points
in every topological elements, which could be imagined as
segments as shown in Fig. 5.
We denote the topological space of a path p as S P(p). The
projection of a path p could be obtained by calculating the
corresponding projection function (Pro1 or Pro2) of every
element γi in p, which is denoted by Pro( p) as shown in
equation 10. The suffixes 1 or 2 could represent specific
projection function accordingly.
Pro(p) = {〈u0, u1, . . . , un〉|∀γi ∈ p, ui = Pro(γi )} (10)
In this paper, we consider two special kinds of paths which
are analyzed in section II-B:
1) A destination path starting from a train to
its scheduled stop location is represented by
pT L = 〈(u0, u0.rs), (u1, u1.rs), . . . , (un, un .rs)〉,
where (u0, u0.rs), (u1, u1.rs), . . . , (un, un .rs) are
the basic topological elements from the train
to the scheduled stop location of the railway
network. The following train is denoted as (u0, u0.rs)
and the scheduled stop location is denoted as
(un, un .rs). We denote the topological space of
pT L as S P(pT L).
2) A train path starting from a train to its
preceding train is represented by pT T =
〈(u0, u0.rs), (u1, u1.rs), . . . , (um, um .rs)〉, where
(u0, u0.rs), (u1, u1.rs), . . . , (um , um .rs) are the basic
topological elements from the train to the preceding
train of the railway network. (u0, u0.rs) has the same
denotation as above. The preceding train is denoted as
(um, um .rs). The topological space of pT T is S P(pT T ).
In order to introduce conditions on this virtual coupling
logic, we define the intersection set between pT L and pT T by
equation 11 and denote its topological space as S.
pT L ∧ pT T = {〈γ0, γ1, . . . , γn〉|
Pro1(γi ) ∈ Pro1(pT L) ∩ Pro1(pT T )} (11)
Then we need to decide the concrete projection values for
the topological element pair in the intersection set between
pT L and pT T . As for the shared topological element pair
γi ∈ pT L ∧ pT T , the value of Pro1(γi ) could be obtained
by Pro1(γ ′i ) or Pro1(γ ′′i ), which refer to the same railway
element ui , i.e., Pro1(γ ′i ) = Pro1(γ ′′i ) = ui . γ ′i ∈ pT T and
γ ′′i ∈ pT L represent topological element pairs in two paths






i ), i f Pro2(γ
′
i ) = Pro2(γ ′′i )
3, i f Pro2(γ ′i ) = Pro2(γ ′′i ).
(12)
Since the topological space is constructed by considering
the safe brake distance of the train, the switch states would
be considered if the distance is not large enough for the train
to pass (the topological switch element would be located in
front of the train as shown in Fig. 4b). In the traditional view,
the safety requirements of the line condition of whether a train
could be virtually coupled or not are shown in definition 19.
Definition 19: The safety requirements of the line condition
of virtual coupling is that |S| ≥ 1 and ∀pt ∈ S, pt .ls =
1, pt .rs = pt .ds, ∀ts ∈ S, ts.ls = 1.
Here |S| ≥ 1 represents that there is at least one topological
element (the train itself) included in topological space S of
S P(pT L) ∧ S P(pT T ).
Definition 20: In the topological view, the following train
could be virtually coupled with the preceding train only if
the topological space (S,TS) is a 1-manifold and ∀pt ∈
S,P (pt) = 1,∀ts ∈ S,T (ts) = 1.
The traditional and topological views are different represen-
tations of the same objects (switches, trains etc.). The locking
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Fig. 6. Illustration of the topological space of the intersection of two paths.
states and position information are essential for switches. Both
views should keep this logic computation related information.
The difference is that based on the topological elements,
we can further analyze the implicit topological property among
the specific railway equipment (which are linked by train
control conditions or principles etc) and express it with the
help of abstract mathematical theory.
The theorem below proves that the condition proposed as
shown in definition 20 is equivalent to the safety requirements
are satisfied.
Theorem 1: A following train can be virtually coupled to
the preceding train if and only if the safety requirements are
satisfied.
Proof: The position, occupation and locking state condi-
tion of a switch and a track section is actually the same in
both the topological view and the traditional view. In what
follows we prove the rest of the condition.
If |S| ≥ 1, then there is an overlapped connected path
between the train-to-train path and the destination path. If no
switches are contained in S, it means that the path is a straight
line without any branch, and so the topological space (S,TS)
consists of basic elements is a 1-manifold.
If |S| ≥ 1 and ∀pt ∈ S, pt .ls = 1, pt .rs = pt .ds,
∀ts ∈ S, ts.ls = 1, ts.rs = ts.os, the overlapping path is
also a straight line due to all the switches having the same
position and all the track sections are connected and ready for
generating movement authority. As a result, the topological
space (S,TS) is a 1-manifold.
In what follows we prove that if the topological space S is a
1-manifold, then the safety requirements are satisfied. In order
to make it simple to prove, we prove the contra-positive state-
ment, i.e. if the safety requirements defined in definition 19
are not satisfied, then the topological space S would not be a
1-manifold.
If there are switch elements contained in S and ∃pt ∈
S, pt .ls = 1, pt .rs = pt .ds, then it means that there exists
an branch like shape (the topological space of the intersection
path between p1 and p2 as shown in Fig. 6) in the intersection
topological space S, i.e., ∃γ ∈ p1, ∃γ ′ ∈ p2 and γ ∈ S, γ ′ ∈
S, Pro1(γ ) = Pro1(γ ′) and Pro2(γ ) = Pro2(γ ′).
Based on the intuitive shape of switch and track sections
as introduced above, the branch here is consisted of a track
section ts and a switch pt . They are connected at a point which
is the end location of the track section ts.pr and also the stem
location of the switch pt .pm. We denote the intersection point
as p. Then p has three directions to go, ts.pl (the left end
location of ts), pt .pr (the reverse end location of pt) or pt .pn
(the normal end location of pt).
Suppose S is a 1-manifold, then point p ∈ S is locally
Euclidean of dimension 1 at the point. Consequently, p
and its neighborhood U is homeomorphic to an open ball
B := B(0, ε) ⊂ Rn , where point p is mapped to 0, n
represents the dimension of the ball B . The homeomorphism
U → B restricts to a homeomorphism U − {p} → B − {0}
(here the minus operator indicated the exclusion of the set
of points from the topological space). Now B − {0} is either
connected if n ≥ 2 or has two connected components if n = 1.
Since U−{p} has three connected components, there can be no
homeomorphism from U − {p} to B − {0}. This contradiction
proves that the branch like shape is not locally Euclidean at
p, therefore the path S is not a 1-manifold. 
If the line condition is not satisfied, then the virtual coupling
operation should not be allowed. At this time, the movement
authority of the following train would be as far as the stem
location of the switch (the switch with different required
positions by two paths). For example, if the intersection set of
two paths is same to the “shape” as shown in Fig 6, i.e., the
following train has a different required position of a switch
with the preceding train, then the movement authority for the
following train would be as far as the stem position of the
switch, unless the switch position has changed to the required
position of the following train.
D. Movement Authority Computation of Virtual Coupling
In this subsection, we would like to talk about the second
problem mentioned in Section II-B on the basis of the line
condition introduced in section III-C is satisfied. The curves
below are defined in the topological space of the intersection
set of paths.
We first introduce the dynamic curves of train movement
and then give the definition of the movement authority of
virtual coupling based on topological manifold theory.
As introduced in our previous paper [30],the movements of
trains are defined as n-manifold denoted by S. Then we map
the neighborhood U ⊆ S into a location-speed (R2, which
is a 2-dimension) or location (R1, which is 1-dimension),
speed (R1, which is 1-dimension) Euclidean space through its
corresponding coordinate map functions (ξs, ξi ) as shown in
equation 15, 21 and 25). Finally, we can compute the relevant
variables according to specific charts (the pair of U and its
map function).
Considering the accuracy requirement for future virtual
coupling logic, the accurate train behavior under worst con-
dition should be taken into consideration when calculating
the movement authority for virtually coupled trains. Conse-
quently, we introduce a safe brake curve which starts with
current state of a train and a safe brake curve to a target
state. Both consider train behavior under potential traction
cutoff and brake buildup process, which makes the behavior
model preciser than introduced in [30] for safety concerns.
In addition, the zero train length assumption of [30] is removed
by considering the maximum safe front and minimum safe rear
of trains, which making our model more realistic.
1) Train Dynamic Curves: In this section, we introduce
three kinds of train dynamic behavior under different situa-
tions: the ideal brake curve, the safe brake curve which starts
with current state and the safe brake curve to a target state.
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TABLE I
NOMENCLATURE OF CURVES IN MANIFOLD THEORY
First we introduce the ideal train braking behavior, which is
defined as shown in definition 21. The train would start brake
immediately from its current speed and location.
Definition 21: The ideal brake curve of a train is a
1-manifold Si which is defined by equation 13. s and v
represent train location and speed variables of a function. src
and vc represent current train’s minimum safe rear end location
and speed, which are specific values. The chart is represented
by (Ui , ξi ), where Ui and ξi are defined by equation 14 and 15.




Ui = {(s, v) ∈ R2|s − src =
1
2dec
v2, 0 < v < vc} (14)




The ideal brake curve is used to calculate the ideal brake
behavior of the preceding train, that’s why a train’s minimum
safe rear end location src and speed vc are used in the equations.
According to the ideal brake curve, we could define the safe
brake curve as starting with current location and speed. The
safe brake behavior considers the worst case condition of the
braking process - that is a train would first cutoff the traction
power and then buildup the brake. During those two processes,
a train could experience extra acceleration phases in the worst
situation.
We first introduce the relevant location and speed functions
during the above two processes as shown in equation 16. s ftc f
and s fbbu represent the maximum safe front end locations of
the train at the end of the traction cutoff and brake buildup
processes. vtc f and vbbu represent the corresponding speed
values at those locations. They are affected by several concrete
parameters according to the train type. The traction cutoff
and brake buildup time durations are denoted by t1 and t2
respectively. The acceleration rate during traction cutoff and
brake buildup process is denoted by a1 and a2 respectively.
s and v in equation 16 represent the location and speed
parameters of a train.
s ftc f (s, v) = s + vt1 + 0.5a1t21
vtc f (v) = v + a1t1
s fbbu(s, v) = stc f (s, v) + vtc f (v)t2 + 0.5a2t22
vbbu(v) = vtc f (v)+ a2t2 (16)
The extra distance dis(v) covered by the train during these
two processes could be computed based on equation 17.










Then, we introduce the safe brake curve starting with the
current maximum safe front end location and speed of a
train, as shown in definition 22. The traction cutoff and brake
buildup processes will be taken into consideration.
Definition 22: The safe brake curve which starts with the
current maximum safe front end location and speed of a train
is a 1-manifold Ss that is defined by the equation 18, where
η(s, v) is shown in equation 19.
Ss





s fc − s + 12a1 (v
2 − v2c ), i f vc ≤ v < vtc f
s ftc f − s +
1
2a2
(v2 − v2tc f ), i f vtc f ≤ v ≤ vbbu
s fbbu − s +
1
2dec
(v2bbu − v2), i f 0 ≤ v < vbbu
(19)
In equation 19, s and v represent the location and speed
of the train. s fc and vc represent the train’s current maxi-
mum safe front end location and speed. stc f (s
f
c , vc), vtc f (vc),
s fbbu(s
f
c , vc) and vbbu(vc) are denoted by s
f
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The chart is represented by (Us , ξs), where Us and ξs are
defined by equation 20 and 21. The details of the map function
ξs(s, v) can be found in equation 22.
Us














s fc + 12a1 (v
2 − v2c ), i f vc ≤ v < vtc f
s ftc f +
1
2a2




(v2bbu − v2), i f 0 ≤ v < vbbu
(22)
In what follows we introduce another dynamic behavior of
trains, the safe brake curve to a target location and speed.
Definition 23: The safe brake curve to a target location
and speed of a train is a 1-manifold Se which is defined by
equation 23. Distance and speed are represented by s and v
respectively. dis(v) is the same as above. The target speed
and target location of the train are represented by vt and st .
Se = {(s, v) ∈ R2|st − s − dis(v) = 1
2dec
(v2 − v2t )} (23)
The chart is represented by (Ue, ξe), where Ue and ξe are
defined by equation 24 and 25. The maximum speed on the
line is denoted by mv.
Ue = {(s, v) ∈ R2|st − s − dis(v)
= 1
2dec
(v2 − v2t ), vt < v < mv} (24)
ξe : Ue → R
ξe(s, v) = s ∈ (st − dis(mv)− 1
2dec
(mv2 − v2t ),
st − dis(vt )) (25)
2) Movement Authority of a Following Train:
Definition 24: The movement authority of a following train
under virtual coupling is the interior of a 2-manifold with
boundary which is denoted by IntMma . It is computed
according to 2-manifold with boundary Mma , which is defined
by equation 26. The chart is represented by (Uma, ξma), where
Uma and ξma are defined by equation 27 and 28.
Mma = {(s, v) ∈ R2|max{s ff c, ξs f (s f , v f )}≤s ≤sp,
max{v f , 0} ≤ v ≤ min{mv, v p}} (26)
Uma = {(s, v) ∈ R2|max{s ff c, ξs f (s f , v f )}<s<sp,
max{v f , 0} < v < min{mv, v p},
0 ≤ v f < v f c, 0 ≤ v p ≤max{v pc, v f c}} (27)
ξma : Uma → R2 ξma(s, v) = (s, v) (28)
The current maximum safe front end location and speed
of a following train are represented by (s ff c, v f c). The current
minimum safe rear end location and speed of a preceding train
are represented by (srpc, v pc) respectively. The corresponding
location and speed domains of a following and a preceding
train are represented by (s f , v f ) and (sp, v p). Take s
f
f c and
s f as an example, s
f
f c is a specific location value of following
train while s f is a set of possible location values of following
train. sp is mapped according to different speed values (see
equation 29). ξs f (s f , v f ) represents the coordinate function
of following train, which maps (s f , v f ) to s f .
sp =
{
ξe f (sp, v p), i f v pc ≤ v p ≤ mv
ξi p(sp, v p), i f 0 ≤ v p < v pc
(29)
Uma is shown in Fig. 7. There are two trains running on the
railway line with the same direction. The current maximum
safe front end location and speed of the following train (the
orange train) is denoted by (s ff c, v f c). The current minimum
safe rear end location and speed of the preceding train (the
blue train) is denoted by (srpc, v pc). According to the kinds
of train dynamic curves above, we could compute the safe
brake curve denoted by Us which starts from (s
f
f c, v f c) of the
following train. The safe brake curve to target (srpc, v pc) of
the following train is denoted by Ue. The ideal brake curve of
the preceding train is denoted by Ui .
In order to acquire the movement authority, there are some
static curves computed based on the movement authority
of the following train. The curves are all 1-manifolds and
denoted by S1, S2, S3 and S4. The corresponding charts of
those curves are denoted by (U1, ξ1), (U2, ξ2), (U3, ξ3) and
(U4, ξ4), where U1 = {(s,mv)|s ff c < s < ξe f (s,mv)},
ξ1(s, v) = s, U2 = {(s ff c, v)|v f c < v < mv)}, ξ2(s, v) = v,
U3 = {(s, 0)|ξs f (s, 0) < s < ξi p(s, 0)}, ξ3(s, v) = s and
U4 = {(s, v pc)|srpc−dis(v pc) < s < srpc}, ξ4(s, v) = s.
As shown in Fig. 7, U1 represents the maximum speed restric-
tion of the line. U2 represents current location limitation of
the following train. U3 represents the zero speed limitation of
the following train. U4 represents the current speed limitation
of the preceding train. The orange rectangle on the distance
axis represent the movement authority in traditional moving
block systems. The EoA is nearly the minimum safe rear end
location of the preceding train. As for the fixed block systems,
the box would be even shorter than the moving block one
according to the location of the occupied track section by the
preceding train.
The boundary ∂Mma of Mma is a 1-manifold defined by
the atlas denoted by Uu = {U1 ∪U2 ∪U3 ∪U4 ∪Ue ∪Ui ∪Us}.
The movement authority of the following train is the interior
IntMma of the 2-manifold with boundary Mma .
We can therefore compute the movement authority of a
following train according to a preceding train’s behavior, if the
line condition on virtual coupling as shown in definition 20 is
satisfied. If the condition is not satisfied, then the following
train would take the last switch equipment which satisfied
the line condition in the intersection topological space S as
the final unit. At this time, we could regard the last switch
equipment as a preceding train whose location is the switch
location and speed is zero. Then, the sp would change to the
safe brake curve ξe f (sp, v p) which takes the start location
of the last switch unit as the End of the Authority (EoA).
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Fig. 7. The movement authority under virtual coupling represented by the manifold IntMma of the following train (MinS R E f , Max S F E f , MinS R E p ,
Max S F E p represent the minimum safe rear end and maximum safe front end locations of following and preceding trains).
That would be the same protection logic as used by current
train control systems which ensures the train stops before its
EoA.
As for the maximum acceleration curve introduced in [30],
we replace it with two static curves (the maximum speed
limitation and the current location limitation of train’s maxi-
mum safe front) instead. The acceleration curve could indeed
assess train’s traction ability with accurate maximum traction
behavior, but has no effect on the safety side. In addition, as for
virtual coupling logic, more information on the movement
dynamics of the interested trains is needed, which means that
more information exchange is demanded to train-to-train com-
munication. That’s why we modeled the movement authority
with U2 and U1 instead. In what follows, we would prove our
proposed protection logic is safe by proving several theorems.
E. Safety Theorems for Our Virtual Coupling
In this part, 3 theorems are proven to interpret and verify
the safety requirements of the virtual coupling control based
on topological manifold theory. The safety requirements of
virtual coupling are formally shown in definition 25 and 26.
In what follows, the relation between the safety requirements
and the manifold based description of the requirements is
proved, which could be used to verify the safety of virtual
coupling logic or further deduce work based upon the manifold
theory.
Theorem 2 is about the safety of the movement authority of
a following train. Here, safety means that the topological space
of the movement authority is enough to stop the following train
in the worst condition, without colliding with the preceding
train based on the virtual coupling logic. Formally, the safety
requirement for that is shown in definition 25. It means the
following train’s location on its safe brake curve starting from
the current location and speed would always be smaller than
the preceding train’s location on its ideal brake curve.
Definition 25: The safety requirement for the MA is: if
v f c ≥ v pc, then ∀v ∈ (0, v pc], ξs f (s f , v f ) < ξi p(sp, v p).
If v f c < v pc, then the requirement would be ∀v ∈
(0, v f c), ξs f (s f , v f ) < ξi p(sp, v p).
Actually, a point on the boundary of the ∂Mma represents
any point between the final locations between the following
and preceding trains. It represents the final location after
specific behavior of trains. Thus, we consider the point p ∈ U3
on the boundary of the manifold ∂Mma as the condition.
Theorem 2: The movement authority IntMma of the fol-
lowing train is safe, if and only if there is a point p ∈ U3 on
the boundary of the manifold ∂Mma .
Proof: Suppose that there is no point p ∈ U3 on
the boundary of ∂Mma , then it means that U3 is empty
(U3 = {(s, 0)|ξs f (s, 0) < s < ξi p(s, 0)} according to the
definition of Uma as shown in equation 27). As a result, s has
no valid values and the equation ξs f (s, 0) < s < ξi p(s, 0)
does not hold, which indicates that ξs f (s f , 0) ≥ ξi p(sp, 0).
Hence, it contradicts the safety requirements in definition 25.
If Mma of the following train is safe, then ξs f (s, 0) <
ξi p(s, 0) and U3 have valid values. In what follows we need
to prove that there is a point p ∈ U3 that is a boundary
point of ∂Mma , not in the interior IntMma . According to the
definition of coordinate neighborhood U3{(s, 0)|ξs f (s, 0) <
s < ξi p(s, 0)}, p ∈ U3 is homeomorphic to an open subset of
∂H2 = {(s, v) ∈ R2|v = 0}. Hence, point p is on the boundary
∂Mma of Mma . 
Based on theorem 2, the safety of the movement authority
under virtual coupling logic can be guaranteed.
Theorem 3 could be used to guarantee the safety of the
following train’s behavior under the virtual coupling control.
We assume the train would follow the safe brake curve starting
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Fig. 8. Part of an existing railway line in China.
with its current location and speed. The safety requirement
is that the behavior of the following train represented by its
location and speed would be contained in the MA as shown
in definition 26. The boundary ∂Mma represents the unsafe
area under the worst condition during train operation.
Definition 26: Suppose the behavior of a following train is
a 1-manifold M f . The safety requirement for the following
train behavior is that ∀p ∈ M f , p is not in the boundary
∂Mma .
Theorem 3: The condition ∀p ∈ M f , p ∈ IntMma in
the topological view implies the safety requirement of the
following train behavior.
Proof: Under the worst situation assumption, a preceding
train would be the one described by Si and a following
train would obey the safe brake action described as Ss . Let
point p ∈ IntMma ⊂ Mma and p ∈ IntMma ∩ ∂Mma .
Suppose V containing p is an open subset of IntMma and
it is homeomorphic to an open subset of R2. Clearly for
point p there is a neighborhood U ⊂ IntMma of p that is
homeomorphic to the open ball B2 (B2 is a subset of R2). Now
U is also homeomorphic to an open interval I (I is a subset
of R), since p ∈ ∂Mma and ∂Mma is a 1-manifold. However,
I is not homeomorphic to B2. Hence, point p ∈ IntMma is
disjoint with the boundary ∂Mma . The train behavior is safe.

Theorem 4: The MAs represented by the 2-manifold for
different trains in the virtual coupling queue do not intersect
with each other.
Proof: Suppose that we have three trains t1, t2, t3 in the
same direction on the same part of a railway line. We assume
train t3 is the preceding train of the three, and is followed
by t2, then t1. The following two trains t1 and t2 are under
control of the virtual coupling logic. In the virtual coupling
logic, the MA of t1 represented by the interior of 2-manifold
IntMma1 would be computed according to the movements of
t2 as its preceding train as introduced above. Similarly for train
t2, which computes its MA IntMma2 based on the movement
of t3 serving as the preceding train.
The atlas for the whole virtually coupled trains is the union
of each denoted by Uma = Uma1 ∪Uma2 as we defined above.
We denote the train t2 as a point p(s2, v2). According to
the definition of MA, the safe brake curve Se of p(s2, v2)
composed of the boundary ∂Mma2 and the ideal brake curve
Si composed of the boundary ∂Mma1 do not intersect with
each other except for the point t2, because of the extra brake
behavior in the safe brake behavior. The point p(s2, v2) is
the intersection point between the safe brake curve of t2
represented by ξs(s2, v2) and the ideal brake behavior of t2
represented by ξi (s2, v2), which is t2 = p(s2, v2) itself. Now
we need to prove that the intersection point p(s2, v2) does not
belong to any of the MA of t2 or t1.
Since point p(s2, v2) belongs to both boundaries of Mma1
and Mma2, i.e. p ∈ ∂Mma1∩∂Mma2, as proved in theorem 3,
p(s2, v2) is not in IntMma1 and IntMma2. As a result,
the MAs for different trains in the virtual coupling queue are
separated from each other. 
Theorem 4 could be used to guarantee the safety of the
movement authorities of both the following and preceding
trains.
IV. CASE STUDY
In this section, we undertake a case study in order to
illustrate the proposed method based on engineering data from
a real railway line. The model is built with current train control
systems equipment, which contains track sections.
A. Example Data and Scenario
For the case study, we will use data from an existing railway
track plan (see Fig. 8). The departure signal of the railway line
serves as the stop location in the model. There are three trains
on the railway line. Train 1 is scheduled to run from its current
location to station LYN. The scheduled stop location in LYN
station is the location of the existing signal X3. Train 2 is
running from its current location to signal XI in station LYN.
Train 3 is scheduled to stop before the signal X5 in station
LYN.
The topological paths pT L and pT T for Train 1 and Train 2
are shown in Fig. 9. Train 1, Train 2 and Train 3 are
represented by u1, u22 and u16. Switches are represented by
green topological elements, the stop locations are represented
by yellow topological elements and the track sections are
represented by purple topological elements. The dashed and
dotted lines represent the pT L of Train 1 and Train 2, denoted
by pT L1 and pT L2. The solid lines represent the pT T of
Train 1 and Train 2, denoted by pT T 1 and pT T 2. The path
for Train 1 is in orange and path for Train 2 is in blue.
As we can see from Fig. 9, pT L1 = 〈γ1, γ2, γ3, γ5, γ19, γ20,
γ21, γ23, γ24, γ22, γ25, . . . , γ29, γ7, γ9, γ11, γ13, γ15, γ10, γ12〉,
pT T 1 = 〈γ1, γ2, γ3, γ5, γ19, γ20, γ21, γ23, γ24, γ22〉. Hence,
the intersection space S1 between pT L1 and pT T 1 is S1 =
{γ1, γ2, γ3, γ5, γ19, γ20, γ21, γ23, γ24, γ22}. Since the required
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Fig. 9. The pT T and pT L in topological unit representation.
TABLE II
CASES CONCERNING WHETHER AN APPRAISED TRAIN IS ALLOWED TO BE VIRTUALLY COUPLED
positions of switch units u3 and u5 by pT L1 and pT T 1 are the
same, the intersection set is a 1-manifold. In addition, since
for all the track sections and switches in S, the value of the
map function P () and T () is 1, the intersection space S1
can be used to realize the virtual coupling control. The results
are also given in Table II.
Regarding pT L2 and pT T 2, pT L2 = 〈γ22, γ23, . . . ,
γ29, γ7, γ9, γ11, γ6, γ8〉 and pT T 2 = 〈γ22, γ23, . . . , γ29, γ7,
γ9, γ11, γ13, γ15, γ14, γ16〉, the intersection space S2 between
pT L2 and pT T 2 is S2 = {γ22, γ23, . . . , γ29, γ7, γ9, γ11}. Since
the required positions of switch 9 in station LYN are different,
the intersection space S2 is not a 1-manifold. The reason
is that there are three components for the stem location of
switch 9, which is γ11 in Fig. 9. As a result, train 2 can only
be allowed to run to the location before the stem location of
switch 9 in station LYN, which is compatible with the notion
of the traditional EoA of the MA.
B. Simulations
In order to show that our method can implement a safe
virtual coupling train control on a single railway line, we con-
duct a simulation to demonstrate it. The line data and scenario
are described as above. We implement virtual coupling safety
protection control logic of two trains (Train 1 and Train 2)
with C++ code on two computers. Here the train-to-train
communication is implemented through a connected net wire,
so there is almost no delay on the communication part.
The parameters for the Train1, Train2 are the same due to
the assumption that trains are of the same type. The emergency
braking deceleration rate is 1m/s2. The values of traction
cutoff and brake buildup time durations t1 and t2 are 0.2s
and 1s respectively for all trains in the example. The values
of the possible acceleration during traction cutoff and brake
buildup process are 1m/s2 and 0.5m/s2 respectively.
As one moment during the whole simulation, the minimum
safe rear end location of Train 1 is on the fourth track section
from ZZX station, where the specific location and speed is
7678m (the location of signal XI in station ZZX is 0m) with
speed of 270 km/h, Train 2 is running at 8503m with its
maximum speed 250km/h. The movement authority of train 1
under virtual coupling at this moment is shown in Fig. 10,
which is the interior area surrounded by of the orange curves.
If we assume that Train 1 is running at 6000m, then the
traditional movement authority under fixed block principle
would be the orange area on the distance axis. It starts from
6000m to the border of the track section (6686m), on which
Train 2 is running. If the moving block principle is adopted,
then the movement authority would be the gray area on the
distance axis, which ends to 8483m, 20 meters away from
the minimum safe rear of Train 1.
As we can see in Fig. 10, the final stop location ξs f (s, 0)
- represented by the red diamond - of the following train
is greater than the current location spc - represented by the
blue circle - of the preceding train, which cannot happen in a
traditional moving block or fixed block signaling system. The
simulation platform is a PC with 64-bit operating system, with
an Intel i7-6700k and 32GB RAM. The simulation time for
the computation of MA in our example is around 8ms.
C. Discussion
The results of the case study show that the proposed method
for virtual coupling can compute the movement authority for
any train. In reality the method can be used independently of
concrete train types, which means that the parameters for the
following train and preceding train could be different. The
simulation time of the proposed manifold based protection
logic is also small enough to satisfy the real-time requirement
of the train control system (here real-time requirement means
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Fig. 10. Simulation scenario of virtual coupling control.
the logic would take less computation time than the control
cycle of the equipment). However, one should note that the
time is only for calculation of the manifold protection logic,
the time for other monitoring, diagnostic and communication
loss is not considered.
Compared with other proposed modeling methods for train
control system, which are based on the point-set topology,
dynamic behavior of trains with their speed and location
are taken into consideration and are represented by manifold
definitions directly. The MA with consideration for continuous
speed information could be computed for virtual coupling
train control, which is impossible using current point-set
topology based control logic. Compared with our previous
method, the effect of switches and track sections are analyzed
in detail under virtual coupling logic. The MA defined in
this paper is more accurate since the effect of safe front
and rear end locations of train are considered. Compared to
the normal arithmetic based virtual coupling logic, railway
signaling equipment information (such as switches) could also
be taken into consideration under the same framework, which
is essential for the protection logic of the virtual coupling
system.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a topological manifold based modeling method
is proposed as a basis for protection logic of virtual cou-
pling systems. We hope that the application of the proposed
modeling and methodology will contribute to a higher level
of integrity in the design and realization of railway virtual
coupling control strategies. Essentially, the method provides
a general formalism to model the concrete elements of train
control systems. A safety analysis is presented with regards
to the relevant locations of basic railway equipment. Based
on that, a movement authority space for the virtual coupling
control is described and implemented. This considers the
dynamic behavior of trains in a combined way. Consequently,
safety proofs of the system can be given in a straightforward
manner with this method. By using this methodology, both
basic railway signaling equipment control and dynamic train
behavior could be formally described in a unified formalism,
which has a significant advantage in the analyzing, designing
and implementing of virtual coupling due to its mathematical
nature.
The elements of railway networks under a virtual coupling
logic are defined as topological units. The topological line
condition for trains running safely under virtual coupling logic
is clearly described by a theorem. The movement authority of
a virtual coupling control system is given and combined with
the dynamic train behavior curves, such that the traditional sig-
naling principle to separate trains on the railway network can
be preserved in an extended 2-dimensional speed and location
space. The case study has shown that the proposed method
is feasible for realizing the virtual coupling logic based on
current train control system. It should result in fewer errors and
less ambiguity in virtual coupling logic implementation, which
is an essentially key problem for the pending technology. More
complex scenarios of virtual coupling control have not been
discussed in this paper, however this approach is expected to
address complex situations in the future.
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